Are we ready for the next round ?

By Kumar Rupesinghe

The next round of negotiations by the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE is bound to resume soon.

The LTTE has invited the President to present a reasonable proposal giving a limited timeframe, failing which there will be a resumption of hostilities. On the other hand the President has stated that they will not be bound by deadlines set by the LTTE.

The two sides are ostensibly preparing for war and peace at the same time. How this process will evolve depends on the genius and strategy adopted by both sides. It is my argument that a step-by-step strategy and architecture should be evolved and multiple strategies adopted to achieve a transformation of the conflict to a sustainable peace. This article will examine some of the issues relating to such a design and architecture.

There seems to be a considerable deviation from the positions articulated by the Alliance since assuming the Presidency.

The significant changes are as follows: The positions taken with regards to the role of Norway by the JVP and the JHU that Norway would be asked to leave or its role substantially reviewed now seems to have been abandoned with the statement by the new Director General of the Peace Secretariat that Norway will remain as the facilitator.

The newspaper reports from Delhi after the visits by the new Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera and the Norwegian Minister for Development Cooperation Erik Solheim confirm the view that India wants the Norwegians to remain and that a settlement should be sought within a United Sri Lanka and not a unitary state. It also reiterates India’s commitment to a United Sri Lanka and it eschews any notion of a separate state. Further in a statement issued from New Delhi by Erik Solheim it is clearly stated that Norway cannot be held as a scapegoat for mistakes committed by the two parties to the conflict.

Norway has stressed that it awaits an invitation by the Government of Sri Lanka. Any review that will take place with regard to Norway’s future role should take into account that our national proclivity of shooting the messenger should not be encouraged.

The President has stressed that the ceasefire should be reviewed and have sought to bring to the agenda the questions of abductions, child conscriptions and political killings. On the other hand the LTTE has stressed that such a review should only be concerned with the implementation of the Cease Fire Agreement and the question of auxiliary forces should be placed on the agenda. Whilst the venue for the talks has not been decided it is important that steps are taken to resolve this issue soon.

The status of the SLMM should be considered. There have been serious criticisms that the Chairmanship being held by a Norwegian represents a conflict of interest. But these critics do not take into account that the decision to have a Norwegian Chair for the SLMM was at the request by the two parties and not imposed by Norway. What is striking however is that both parties have not made any attempts to explain the role of the SLMM to the general public.

Up to today the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) has not been translated into Sinhalese or Tamil four years after the Agreement was signed! Furthermore there is a profound misunderstanding of the mandate of the CFA. Some critics expect the SLMM to perform a policing function, which is outside the mandate of the CFA. The mandate of the CFA is only to monitor the CFA.

It has no powers of ensuring compliance by both parties. If we examine the violations of the CFA it is clear that political killings by the LTTE and auxiliary forces have significantly escalated this year.

There is no doubt that a proxy war is conducted by both sides and this matter has to be seriously addressed. Further, there is currently no verification mechanism with regards the numerous violations that have been committed. In future talks, a solid verification machinery should be put in place. Investigation of political killings in the Northeast and Colombo is a police function. The police have failed to apprehend any of the perpetrators. This means that the capacity of the police should be seriously strengthened and cooperation between the Police and the LTTE must be a prerequisite for any success.

Further the questions of human rights violations have been brought up numerous times and in the Ian Martin proposal, which he submitted in Japan there is a role for independent human rights monitoring.

Those who are currently advising the President should seriously study the agreements reached in El Salvador where an independent human rights protocol was signed. Whilst political killings and child recruitment should be high on the agenda, the plight of many refugees who are still seeking support, i.e. the right to be settled, as well as the large numbers who are refused habitation in the High Security Zones should come under the purview of such discussions.

Further, serious attention should be given to the rights of a people to enjoy and exercise their own language, i.e. the implementation of the Tamil Language as a national language.

Every government has neglected the implementation of these provisions. It is very unfortunate that there are few police officers or administrators who are able to speak Tamil in the Northeast.
Despite pressure by the JHU and the JVP, the President by signing the gazette notification regarding the merger of the Northeast has indicated that at least for now he is committed to indivisible North East Provincial Council. But the Government should take note that the Eastern region is the most volatile and dangerous with continuous killings by various forces, which could endanger the peace process. It could lead to inadvertent war. Governments have paid scant attention to peace building programs between the communities and have no plan to create an environment of tranquility in that region. It is important that regular talks between the military and the LTTE should be resumed and sustained. The LTTE on the other hand must address the grievances of the Muslim and Sinhalese communities.

The UNF negotiations concentrated too much on high table discussions between the parties and ignored the grievances of communities in the North East. The Sinhalese question and the Muslim question must be given high priority. For example 100,000 Muslims are languishing in Puttalam and elsewhere after being forcibly evicted by the LTTE fourteen years ago.

Further, over hundred thousand acres of agricultural lands has been acquired by the LTTE in the Eastern region. The land claims of the Muslims have been recorded and a register has been delivered to the LTTE but it requires a decisive intervention by the LTTE.

The Government has rejected the P-TOMs and has instead announced the formation of a new super entity to handle relief and rehabilitation as a single authority.

The UNF government and the Chandrika Presidency failed to provide a structure, which could adequately address the problems of rehabilitation in the North East.

There were too many structures in place. As a matter of priority the problems of tsunami victims and war victims should be addressed immediately and simultaneously. Over a million people are languishing in makeshift shelters and are living in despair. Addressing their claims assumes the highest priority. An accelerated development plan can do much as a confidence building measure. I am also glad that the authority vested in the highly elitist TAFFREN would be restructured.

The UNF focused too much on bilateral negotiations. The President has indicated that his peace initiative will be fundamentally different. He has stressed the importance of consultation with all other parties in parliament and outside. If we take a leaf from the South African experience a platform should be created for continuous consultations with all parties. Another mechanism which was used in South Africa, Guatemala and North Ireland was to engage civil society as a partner in the peace process.

Scant attention to this was given by the UNF peace process. Such a platform should be inclusive and include not only the peace lobby with its limited Colombo base but trade unions, the Chambers of Commerce, professional organizations and representatives of the regions who could provide creative advice and support. Further in the South African experience, through the National Peace Accord, efforts were made to create viable peace committees at the grass roots level. These committees represented different sectors and parties,which played an important role in creating the space for dialogue.

The UNF acted within the constraint of a hostile President in a situation of dual power. The current President has no such impediments. He has the mandate from the Sinhalese people to pursue a just solution. Therefore the previous policy of pragmatism followed by the UNF should be replaced by a sound architecture and design.

I do hope that a lot of thought will go into this matter. Such architecture should ensure that the entire peace process is monitored and shortcomings rectified throughout the process. It should not be an ad hoc process. The peace process does not mean just the negotiations held at the high table but peace building initiatives to promote confidence building, coexistence and reconciliation at the grass roots level! Such an operational entity should be located within the President’s office and be accountable to the President. The Peace Secretariat and the Muslim Peace Secretariat should be brought directly under the purview of the President’s office. The operations room, which is currently under the Peace Secretariat should be evaluated and revamped. A Minister close to the President should be asked to oversee the entire strategy.

The LTTE has declared that it is waiting for a reasonable proposal from the President. He should avoid sending proposals, which are likely to be rejected by the LTTE. The UNF sent three such proposals, which were all rejected. It is better that these proposals are informally discussed either in the form of workshops which can be conducted by proxies appointed by both sides. These informal meetings can be useful in reducing the levels of intractability.

The parameters for such a proposal to be submitted by the President are the provisions of the 13th Amendment with additional powers vested in the North East Provincial Council and the proposal submitted by the LTTE for an Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA). The deep divide between the two proposals should be addressed through such meetings. There should be a proper back channel, which can test the waters.

The LTTE has declared that it will resume hostilities within next year. The President has indicated that he will not be bound by deadlines. Both sides are preparing for hostilities. Given the time frame a multi-level and multi-track policy must be adopted. It is the art of politics to manoeuvre the situation both for war and peace.

As a great Chinese sage Sun Tzu once said, a war is best won without firing an arrow