Possible ways of preventing a war

By Dr. Kumar Rupesinghe

Nobody will doubt today that Sri Lanka is at war. The statistics tell the story. Over 20 persons killed since the Presidential elections. Over 70 armed forces personnel killed by claymore mines and suicide attacks. The regional and ethnic distribution of the casualties also demonstrates that the war has spread to all the regions of the North East.

The nature of the attacks, i.e. the use of deadly claymore mines and a suicide squad ramming the duvora fast Attack Craft off Trincomalee is the work of professionals and no civilian force would have had the knowledge or sophistication to develop or use such weapons.

The SIPRI Year book defines war as a battle with over 1000 casualties annually. It also defines a smaller war as one where there are over 500 casualties a year. As the statistics demonstrate we will soon pass the threshold of a small war. The escalation to a large-scale war will be a matter of time. The SLMM in its latest report has suggested that the LTTE should bear the responsibility for these killings, which constitute a gross violation of the Ceasefire Agreement.

Military-civilian relations.

The Mahinda Presidency has reacted with restraint in the battlefield and its armed forces have been ordered to act with maximum restraint and not to yield to provocation. But the battle to be won is not only in the battlefield but more significantly it is about how to prevent the insurgents winning the hearts and minds of the people. What is axiomatic is that the armed forces should be careful to make a distinction between the armed wing of the LTTE and the Tamil speaking people. If they are all lumped together and there is no distinction made then it would be natural for the Tamils to identify with the LTTE.

I remember in the early days when President J.R. Jayewardene instructed his nephew, Brigadier Bull Weeratunge, to go to the North and settle the problem of terrorism within a matter of six months. Weeratunge exacerbated the situation by not distinguishing between terrorists and civilians and by treating all Tamils as potential terrorists. The burning of the Jaffna Library and the indiscriminate attacks on civilians are well known to observers and helped to escalate the conflict and also led the government to fall into the trap of the insurgent movement. The ranks of the insurgent movement were filled with bitter and angry youth due to the humiliation they received from the military. I am afraid that we have not learnt from those mistakes and some of the current trends in our armed forces indicate that civilian relations have worsened.

Let me enumerate this by citing some examples. It is reported that disappearances have begun to rise in the last two months. The disappearances are not only in the North but also in the East. Disappearances are a morally debilitating and corrosive aspect of warfare and unless checked early it can lead to a serious loss of confidence. Immediate action has to be taken and proper judicial inquiries conducted to assure the people that arbitrary actions would not take place. Those responsible must be punished.

Search operations of Tamils in the North East and Colombo are a repetition of the operations that were carried out between 1995 and 2000. During that time, the cordon and search operations, were seen by Tamils, as arbitrary and the arrest of large numbers of people alienated them. We seem to be repeating these mistakes once again. Cordon and search operations may be required for security reasons but blanket and mass-scale searches and arrests are debilitating and turn ordinary citizens into sullen and hostile citizens.

Armed forces and police intimidation of civilians in Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara are on the rise and has become a daily occurrence. The shooting of five Tamil youth and the rendering of two others critically injured is not only outrageous but does not conform to the President’s call for restraint. Those who gave the order in Colombo and those responsible must be apprehended and tried before the law. If we are to learn lessons from salutary practice in military civilian relations under conditions of war then it is better to learn these lessons from Northern Ireland and even in India, where in both cases the armed forces have learnt that to win the war you have to win the hearts and minds of the people. If you push the people to the side of the insurgents you have lost the war.

This is a universal axiom learnt after many bitter experiences. There seems to be a vicious cycle of violence being pursued in the current situation. The LTTE concentrates on attacking the military whilst the military responds by attacking civilians. This tit for tat attrition has now escalated to ever-rising waves of violence.

Need for a security doctrine

It is abundantly clear from the ad hoc reactions of the armed forces that the Government lacks a clear security doctrine, which is a precondition for a stable and sustainable military strategy. There are many aspects with regard to the need for a security doctrine, which will not be the subject of this paper but experts will be well advised to devise one. To take one example, let us look at the question of arms procurement, which has served to corrode the moral integrity of the armed forces.

No government has actually succeeded in developing a procurement policy in accordance with the security needs of the country. Ad hoc and arbitrary decisions are made and weapons purchased with no relationship to the security requirements of the country. The recent revelations in the Sunday Times is ample evidence of the level of degradation that we have come to. There are many other lacunae with regards security policy at all levels.

Another unfortunate habit that we have inherited is to change the high command of the military and the intelligence each time there is a regime change. This mistake has now been repeated under the Mahinda Presidency, where the functional work of the intelligence services is once again reorganized and where the skills and knowledge of our services are not available to the President. What is now very unfortunate is that people who had assumed notoriety for their heavy-handed way in dealing with security matters have been reinstated. Other armchair amateurs and Sinhala extremist individuals are getting closer to the security establishment. The infiltration of the JHU and the JVP and other forces into the armed forces and intelligence agencies means that they not only manipulate information but also predetermine events towards war and embarrass the President.

The military objectives of the LTTE

The military objectives of the LTTE judging by the escalation of violence against the security forces are a prelude to another war. Unlike in the past the LTTE has developed an advanced military doctrine based on their battle field victories of the past as well as international experiences. Today the LTTE more or less has a conventional army and navy, and have a few aircraft, a guerilla force and also suicide squads ever willing to risk their lives for the cause. The other theoretical advance they have made in their current military doctrine is to evolve a concept of a people’s war, attuned to urban conditions.

This strategy is evident when you peruse their websites where they claim that over 30,000 civilians have been trained in combat in the last few months. Col. Banu recently remarked that he is ready to distribute 25,000 weapons to civilians in Batticaloa and they will also engage in an air war. He called upon the people of Batticaloa to prepare for a peoples uprising such as in Jaffna and Mannar. Further citizen’s movements have mushroomed all over the North and East, such as the movement for the Liberation of the High Security Zones, Territory Protection Army, Pongu Thamil Administration Group, Maravar Army, Tamil Resurgence Groups etc.

The theoretical concept of a people’s uprising is derived from the experiences of the Intifadeh where a sophisticated strategy was evolved by the Palestinians to deal with the Israeli occupation Army.

The elements of this strategy was to deploy large numbers of civilians to attack the occupying forces with stones and bricks in wave after wave, and at the same to deploy suicide squad attacks at the heart of Israel. Selected military targets were under constant attack by Palestinian insurgents. The only difference in the LTTE strategy is that the civilians are being equipped not with stones and bricks but with lethal weapons.

Talks on the Ceasefire agreement.

It seems that the LTTE will go on the offensive if the visit of the Norwegian Minister of Development does not deal with the issue of venue and the date for the talks. The LTTE is still adamant on Oslo where they say that if the Government has accepted Norway as a facilitator then why not have it in their capital. President Rajapakse on the other hand fears that an agreement to have the talks in Oslo may bring down his fragile government with the JVP leaving the coalition. He has stated that he is prepared to consider any other alternative but Oslo.

Too much is at stake and the Norwegian facilitator is now reposed with too much expectations. Only a few months ago he was demonized beyond any limit of decency. Some have suggested South Africa as a venue. It is my view that the President should not be blackmailed by a minority party in Parliament and should go for the talks in Oslo, insisting however that subsequent talks will be held in Asia. The need of the hour is to start talks soon.

If there is no agreement on the venue then measures have to be found to avoid a resumption of hostilities. If there is failure and if the LTTE decides to take over Jaffna then their strategy would be to come for talks from a position of strength. It would be a short war. They may feel that the international situation is propitious for such a move but also that South India will prevent any military interference from Delhi. During the last attempt to occupy Jaffna when the Sri Lankan troops were marooned in the peninsula it was the Indian Government who volunteered to evacuate troops if the need arose.

However the LTTE is taking a high risk strategy which may backfire where such a take-over propels an international military coalition which may come to the assistance of the Government. In a similar development in 1995 the LTTE gave a warning and broke the negotiations process with the Chandrika Kumaratunga government.

They then attacked a naval ship in Trincomalee on the assumption that the sinking of a naval craft would be a signal to the Government and that talks would resume soon. But this strategy backfired and the LTTE had to face a determined President who campaigned for ‘war for peace’ causing great damage to both sides.

These scenarios are mere speculation for what is at hand is how to prevent such a resumption of hostilities. I suggest that the following steps are taken simultaneously to de-escalate the violence.

Recommendations and policy options

• As I have argued earlier strict military discipline has to be maintained avoiding all forms of provocation with no retaliation on civilians. As a confidence building measure, excesses committed by the military should be subject to an inquiry and those who are guilty punished.

• Cordon and search operations should be done on a selective basis where the highest form of professionalism should be demonstrated by the armed forces and the police. Operational guidelines should be put into immediate effect. Where raids are conducted in the night and where citizens are taken to police stations they must be allowed to dress and to be informed of their rights under the law.

• Harassment of civilians at sentry points and during searches in buses, trains and public places must be stopped immediately.

• An Ombudsman should be put in place to receive complaints from citizens. Such an Ombudsman should be given wide powers of inquiry. The Human Rights Commission has just initiated a 24-hour help line with three retired judges to make inquiries. These initiatives should be given sufficient publicity so that citizens can avail themselves of their services.

• There should be a resumption of talks between the Military and the LTTE. During the ceasefire such talks did take place as a matter of routine. Many intricate problems on the ground were resolved through these military committees. When the trouble began in Jaffna such a committee was under consideration by both of the parties but it was stopped on the advice of amateurs who felt that these committees would give unfair advantage to the LTTE.

• There is no way that auxiliary forces will be dismantled by the Government since they will be looked upon as a prime asset to be used in case of warfare but efforts by the Government to restrict their activities and enter into an agreement regarding the cessation of hostilities should be implemented as a matter or priority.

• Citizens committees who can maintain vigilance and peace in their areas should be created in all parts of the North East and all efforts made to promote peace building and coexistence amongst the communities.

• A Peace Envoy should be appointed of Cabinet rank answerable to the President and who enjoys the trust of the President. The Peace Secretariat should be substantially reorganized and come under the Peace Envoy.

• A similar political authority should be established within the North East Provincial Council. Currently the North and East does not have a political authority and decisions are taken from Colombo. A political Authority should be established in the region, which can sustain peace building amongst the communities.

• A Platform should be created where civil society leaders, trade unions leaders and religious leaders’ views can be consulted on a regular basis.