War or peace in Sri Lanka?

By Kumar Rupesinghe

The President in his address to Parliament has reaffirmed his commitment to the peace process. He has stated that he is committed to a peaceful settlement to the conflict and has rejected war. There has been a fundamental shift in his position regarding many concessions, which over the years had been given on the Tamil National Question. He has stated categorically that he rejects a solution outside the unitary state, that he rejects the concept of a homeland for any ethnic group in the country and that he rejects the concept of self-determination of the Tamil people.

He has however added that maximum devolution of power will be provided within the unitary state. With regards the role of third parties he will seek the assistance of the United Nations in the negotiations process, with the help of Asian countries and other friendly countries (without mentioning the role of Norway). Further he has abrogated the agreement between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE about the PTOMS and has stated that he rejects only bilateral negotiations and would want to have an inclusive policy of consulting other stakeholders such as the Muslims and political parties inside and outside Parliament. Most of these positions go back to the fundamentals which were elaborated during the beginning of the negotiations in Thimpu in 1984 by the former President J.R. Jayewardene’s brother.. We have come full circle in twenty years.

Pirabahakaran, on the other hand, in his Heroes Day speech has indicated the policy governing the LTTE by reasserting the Right of Self Determination and their decision to struggle for their rights in the coming years. In his extensive speech he says that they have no faith in the political structures of the South and sees the Mahinda Rajapakse Presidency as a representative of Sinhalese hegemony. He acknowledges that the President is a pragmatist and has various conflicts within his own government and has given some time for the President to articulate his views. The statement by the LTTE is unambiguous in that they have rejected any concessions from any government in the future. Pirabahakaran acknowledges that there is a vast gap between the two positions. He has not rejected future negotiations but suggests that the negotiations must be based on recognition of Tamil aspirations. He has asked the President to offer a reasonable political solution. Over the last 20 years the LTTE has stood firm on the principles enunciated at the Thimpu talks and the Mahinda Presidency has also gone back to fundamental positions. Both have not rejected future negotiations.

Lessons Learnt from previous negotiations

Given the pledges that President Rajapakse has given that he is committed to a peaceful resolution of the conflict and has called for negotiations it would be interesting to go back to previous negotiations and see what lessons could be learnt. Unlike when the talks started in Thimpu in 1985, the LTTE has grown from being a small militant group to a monolithic dictatorship with a formidable military apparatus and extensive control of territory in the Northeast. Both sides have been arming themselves heavily with destructive weapons. The Ceasefire Agreement does not prevent either side from rearming themselves; perhaps this is a major flaw in the CFA. The LTTE has been rearming itself with long-range missiles, with a small air force, a navy and has consolidated its territorial base. The government procured weapons from many countries and has increased its battalion strength since the ceasefire. Any resumption of hostilities will have enormous consequences for both sides.

If we are to learn any lessons from international experiences it has been found that in situations of civil wars that 75% of ceasefire agreements breakdown followed by a resumption of hostilities. Another lesson that we have learnt throughout this protracted civil war in Sri Lanka is that each time negotiations broke down the conflict escalated with massive losses for both sides. If we analyze all the efforts to negotiate a settlement to the Tamil National Question we recognize that we have missed many opportunities and challenges to end the conflict. All Sri Lankan Governments have failed to understand the depth of Tamil Nationalism. Jayewardene interpreted Tamil Nationalism as Tamil Terrorism and sought to resolve the problem through military means. The first axiom that we should have learnt is that you do not win a struggle for self-determination by military means. State terrorism, which was deployed in ample measure at the time, only helped to fuel the ranks of the militant groups at that time. The LTTE on the other has failed to understand the fears and concerns of the majority community as well as concerns with regards gross human rights violations committed by the LTTE by the international community.

The Indo- Sri Lanka Accord

The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was Jayewardene’s answer to the Tamil National Question. Jayewardene during his election campaign in 1977 had promised to solve the National Question and promised to convene a round table conference of all Tamil parties. Mesmerized by his five-sixths majority Jayewardene went back on his promise on calling for a round table conference. During that time Jayewardene faced two insurgencies one in the North and one in the South. He calculated correctly that he could not fight on two fronts and decided to bring the Indian Government into the picture and make it India’s problem! He was then able to deploy his troops to face a possible JVP led insurgency.

The mistake that was committed at that time was the failure of India to persuade the LTTE to agree to the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. India should have maintained distance from both parties. This failure to involve the LTTE was to have major consequences, which eventually led to a war between the LTTE and the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF). India was not able to keep the peace. The mistake committed by the LTTE was that they did not accept the generous proposal offered by the Indian Government where the LTTE would govern the Northeast for a period of five years with majority representation in the Northeast Provincial Council

The Premadasa-LTTE talks

President Premadasa throughout his election campaign promised that as a “Son of the Soil” with deep roots amongst the people that he understood the aspirations of the youth militants in the South and the North and was prepared to have direct talks with their two organizations. Based on the Indian experience he refused to accept third party mediation. To achieve the objective of getting the IPKF he initiated talks with the LTTE. The LTTE was only too keen for such an alliance because it was facing extreme difficulties with the IPKF and was on the verge of a defeat.

As a confidence building measure he provided arms and resources to the LTTE to engage in hostilities against the Indian Army. At the request of President Premadasa India withdrew its forces under a cloud of humiliation. India has learnt its lessons and was to disengage itself from providing its enormous leverage and goodwill it had to negotiate an end to the conflict. Meanwhile the negotiations had resumed with the LTTE which took over a year but finally broke down. Hostilities resumed from the LTTE side with a massive attack on Police personnel in the East and attacks on the military which had been placed in barracks. In retrospect it is clear that President Premadasa was not able to fulfill the promises he had given to the LTTE such as revoking the 6th amendment. A lack of a two-thirds majority hindered his efforts. Efforts by Premadasa to engage with the Southern insurrection also failed when the JVP launched an insurrection on the shadow of the protest against the Indo Sri Lanka Accord. The suppression of the JVP was brutal where most of its central committees were eliminated and many young people were killed.

Kumaratunga – LTTE talks

President Chandrika Kumaratunge came to power promising to end the war. A war weary population voted for her in large numbers and she secured a victory with over 62 per cent of the votes. Chandrika had all the credentials to be a Peace Maker. She was the only person who had visited Madras with her popular husband to meet the LTTE and after her victory at the Presidential polls had visited Jaffna to receive a spontaneous welcome given to her by the Jaffna people. The honeymoon did not last long! She selected four of her trusted colleagues to engage in negotiations with the LTTE.

From the very beginning the negotiations was stuck over several issues. The LTTE wanted confidence building measures to precede formal talks and argued that the suffering of the people should be addressed first. The GoSL maintained that confidence-building measures should be done simultaneously whilst discussing core issues. On the ground there were difficulties in dismantling a regime of controls and there was considerable prevarications in allowing essential goods to go through the embargo imposed by the military. There was an exchange of letters, which became increasingly hostile. The end result of this failure to create a proper framework was that hostilities were inevitable and the LTTE withdraw from the cessation of hostilities and engaged in military attacks on the Sri Lankan Navy. The negotiations process was in tattlers. Once again the failure in communications between the two parties, misperceptions and distrust over each others intentions led to a high level of verbal hostilities. There was no mediator or third party to assist the two parties.

The War for Peace strategyThe President then declared the War for Peace strategy. The war for peace was an example of a deadly conflict in operation. The President argued that the only way to bring the LTTE to the negotiations table was to weaken them militarily and engaged in an extraordinary military adventure, which eventually led to the take over of Jaffna. The entire Tamil population of over 500,000 people was evacuated by the LTTE to the Wanni. Further many battles were fought and the Sri Lankan military suffered many military defeats culminating in the attack on the Katunayake Airport. Military analysts blame these defeats on the politicization of the military, where political objectives took precedence over military objectives, impossible deadlines imposed to satisfy political objectives and a flawed command structure. During the pursuit of the war, President Kumaratunge realized that it was impossible to negotiate without an external facilitator and invited the Norwegians to facilitate negotiations. The facilitator was invited whilst the war for peace strategy was on.

Wickremesighe – LTTE talks

Ranil Wickremesinge won the general elections pursing a peace agenda and promised that if he came to power he would create an Interim Administration for the North East. The election campaign was based on the vilification of Wickremesinghe who was accused of a secret pact with the LTTE. The brief period of the UNF period was a landmark in the negotiations where hostilities were terminated through Norwegian facilitation of a Ceasefire Agreement signed by both parties. The CFA restored normalcy to the entire country except for part of the north and has remained so for the last four years.

Six rounds of negotiations took place in foreign capitals before they were abruptly terminated by the LTTE. During this interregnum Wickremesinghe faced a hostile President and the situation of dual power was to end in a humiliating coup against him where the President took over three Ministries, dissolved Parliament and eventually formed her own government. The President who had been a stern critic of the CFA was to say subsequently that it was an important landmark for the country, and that it created conditions of normalcy and led to investor confidence and economic growth.

The brief interlude in which the President presided over a government with coalition partners including the JVP was to be short-lived. The President did not receive the two thirds majority that she expected and could not pursue a policy of negotiations with the LTTE. It was indeed President Chandrika Kumaratunge who invited the JVP into a coalition for clear opportunist reasons and therefore created a basis for the JVP to create strong base within the country. The Tsunami created conditions for a new dialogue with the LTTE where a Joint Mechanism (P-TOMs) would be set in place for the flow of resources to the North-East. A Trust Fund was to be created where the LTTE would enjoy a majority in the Council entrusted with the task of promoting relief and rehabilitation. The establishment of P-TOMs would lay the foundations for confidence building as a prelude to restart the negotiations process. However she faced continuous attrition from the JVP and during the period of negotiations on the P-TOMs faced hostile demonstrations from the JHU and the JVP which eventually led to the JVP leaving the government. The Supreme Court ruled against the P-TOMs through an Interim Stay Order, which spelt the demise of any arrangement for confidence building with the North East.

Learning some lessons.

This long account of failed negotiations has many lessons to learn. Each failed negotiation increased the level of violence and polarization between the Government and the LTTE. The lesson that should be learnt is that do not go for negotiations if you do not have clear objectives. The second lesson is that negotiations should be genuine without hidden agendas from either side. Another lesson is that there should be a clear value frame towards which both sides should agree to, where human rights and self-determinations rights should be respected.

The presence of a third party is absolutely necessary. When you do have a third party do not shoot the messenger, which happened with India and seems to be happening with the Norwegians. Do not demonize the facilitator. If Norway is be taken out as a facilitator then it has to be a decision taken by both parties. If the Norwegians withdraw then are we to assume that the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission should also withdraw? And who should replace the Norwegians? These are questions that both the parties have to work through.

Consulting all stakeholders is a laudable exercise but if taken too far betrays a lack of a clear strategy. Previous attempts at consulting stakeholders amounted to little and only served and provided a platform for those opposed to the peace process as a whole. But at the same time UNF relied solely on the Bi-lateral relationship between the two parties. It is clear that mechanisms can be created for talks at the head table to be at the bi-lateral level but where consultations can be taken in a number of smaller tables. Such a model was successfully tried in South Africa.

The Ceasefire Agreement should be certainly reviewed and it is intolerable that either side violates provisions of the CFA. There is already an agreement to review the CFA and talks should begin soon.

A clear communications strategy must be articulated, all governments failed to keep the people fully informed about what was going on. Documentation of past efforts at negotiations, learning lessons from the past and having able negotiators is a prerequisite for success.

Obtaining the support of the international community to share the burden of the negotiations and obtaining their support is another prerequisite for not being isolated within the world community. There is a great danger that the international community may slowly withdraw from its obligations if there is not a strong commitment to a negotiations strategy. As Sri Lanka is a middle-income country most of the bilateral donors would have withdrawn if not for their involvement in the peace process.

The LTTE throughout its protracted conflict also should read the lessons carefully. To a large extend the initial support that it had from the world community for their struggle for justice and freedom has been seriously dented. The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India lost its support base in Tamilnadu. Acts of Terrorism against political leaders, the assassination of Southern political leaders and leaders from the Tamil community led to it being banned in many countries in the West. There is a danger that if violations continue that it would be banned within the member states of the European Union. Judging by the boycott engineered in Jaffna to prevent a large voter turnout it is obvious that the LTTE has once again gone back to basics i.e. to prepare the ground for a separate state.

The Mahinda Presidency’s greatest challenge is to prevent war and sue for peace in an increasing hostile environment. The LTTE’s greatest challenge remains to secure its demands through negotiations. The divide between the two sides is enormous. The Mahinda Presidency represents a highest level of Sinhalese representation its task would be to broad base its popular base to include those in the opposition including minority parties. A bi-partisan agreement is a fundamental prerequisite for a future negotiations process.

Finally there is a great danger that the current stalemate could lead to inadvertent war. A mechanism should be created whereby in such an eventuality steps are taken for verification and de-escalation of the conflict. In an increasing polarized environment such a mechanism is a categorical imperative.